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From Pipedream to Possibility: How 
European Integration has Helped 
Secessionist Movements
Austin E. Bicknell 
University of Washington
Abstract
The European project has brought the states of Europe ever closer together while 
inadvertently strengthening secessionist movements that seek to fracture the very states it 
has brought together. Through integration, many of the benefits a region with a potential 
desire for independence gains from remaining a part of its host state are transferred to the 
European level. Current academic consensus argues that European integration has overall 
harmed secessionist movements, but since the UKs decision to leave the EU, this argument 
has become outdated and no longer holds the strength it once did. This article uses current 
academic literature on the topic as well as statements from European politicians and separat-
ist political parties to explore and compare the cases of secessionist movements in Scotland, 
Catalonia, and Flanders. While chosen for their strength and their diversity in circum-
stances, these independence movements are united in being transformed from pipedreams 
to possibilities thanks to European integration.
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1. Introduction
For centuries, as empires and states rose and fell, the borders of Europe have been 
in a state of constant flux. Regular cycles of war and conflict encouraged the formation of 
larger political entities and regional identities and cultures were tucked within these larger 
states. In the more recent decades following the second World War, a relatively long era of 
peace and international cooperation has created a calm geopolitical atmosphere where the 
risk of aggression from other states has decreased significantly. This stable environment has 
reduced the competition between larger and smaller states, allowing the latter to flourish. 
While there have been many boarder changes in Eastern Europe after the fall of the iron 
curtain, the step-by-step process of accession to the EU has stabilized the states and their 
territories. Despite this stability, independence movements ranging in size and strength have 
risen and, in some cases, now pose a real threat to existing borders. European integration has 
transformed Europe and now may be leading to a redrawing of Europe’s borders. If political 
actors and central governments want to prevent being blindsided by secessionist movements 
seeking to topple existing states, the effect of European integration on secessionist move-
ments must be reviewed and understood.
2. Methodology
Research into the relationship between European integration of secessionist move-
ments is not highly developed and the reality that there has not yet been a case of secession 
from an EU member state has made it difficult for both researchers and voters to predict ex-
actly how the process of secession from an EU or former EU member state would be carried 
out. This paper will use existing academic literature alongside statements made by political 
parties and both former and current European politicians to analyze how European integra-
tion has impacted secessionist movements. The cases of Scotland in the United Kingdom, 
Catalonia in Spain, and Flanders in Belgium will be used to show how European integration 
is playing a role in different secession movements.
This paper is divided into three core sections. First, what sparks and drives seces-
sion movements will be covered. Second, the effects of European integration on secession 
movements will be analyzed and argued. Finally, a close look at the secessionist movements 
of Scotland, Catalonia, and Flanders followed by a comparison of these cases will be used 
to illustrate that the impact of integration can be seen in secessionist movements that differ 
from one another. 
3. Independence 101: Basis of Secessionist Movements
In the past, secessionist movements were often spearheaded and lead by paramilitary 
rebel forces, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in early twentieth-century Ireland. 
Today, European secessionist movements are grounded in achieving independence through 
peaceful, democratic means via an agreed process with the host state, such as the 2014 Scot-
tish independence referendum which was agreed to by the UK government, and lead by 
one or multiple pro-independence political parties. 
Understanding what sparks and drives these movements is of vital importance for 
researchers trying to understand the impact of European integration on secessionist move-
ments, but also for central governments to ensure that secessionist movements either do 
not begin or remain on the political fringe. Independence debates are often seen as “head 
vs. heart,” meaning that arguments based on logic surrounding topics such as the economy 
come into conflict with arguments that are more based on sentiments and national identity. 
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Topics that fall into the “heart” category are often the catalyst for the birth of a secession-
ist movement and serve as the core of the movement. Secessionists then use topics of the 
“head” to try and re-enforce arguments based on sentimental matters. Actors that support 
remaining with the host state often follow this model in reverse, using logic-based argu-
ments around the economy, health care, social welfare, and overall stability as the core of 
their message re-enforced by sentimental arguments and messaging about shared history, 
achievements, and culture with the rest of the host state.
Based on historical evidence, it appears that secessionist movements that become 
mainstream and garner a sizable portion of public support share the following characteris-
tics: 1) a regional and/or national identity different or stronger than the rest of the host state 
and 2) a deep, long-lasting dissatisfaction with the host state. These kinds of dissatisfactions 
include, but are not limited to: being a “donor region” which regularly contributes more in 
taxes to the central government than it receives back in services, being under the control of 
a central government often led by a party which holds little support in the region, holding 
and prioritizing a different set of political and social values from the rest of the host state, a 
feeling in the region that its voice and interests are not respected by the central government, 
and a feeling that the central government is ineffective.
4. Effects of European Integration
European integration and secession both fundamentally interact with the concept of 
sovereignty, with integration transferring some national sovereignty to the European level 
and secession transferring sovereignty from the central government of the host state to the 
seceding region. In the process of transferring some sovereignty and competencies to the 
European level, many benefits of a region remaining with its host state were also transferred 
to the European level, paving a path for secessionist movements to take deep roots in re-
gions such as Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders, and potentially more in the future. As Borne 
(2014) describes in her paper analyzing Europeanization and secession, integration has cre-
ated both opportunities and constraints for secessionists and anti-secessionists (also known as 
unionists). This complexity is further highlighted by Muro & Vlaskamp (2016), who state 
that “the EU’s structure may stimulate support for an independent state while discouraging 
the act of secession” (p. 1116). However, a closer look at these effects can help simplify the 
impacts of integration.
In many ways, the EU has helped to stimulate support for independence movements, 
primarily by creating an environment where small states can be successful and the negative 
impacts of being a small state are significantly minimized. Basic arguments against secession 
are driven by fears that the new state will be too small to be successful, will become more 
isolated, and will lose the benefits of being part of a larger economic and political entity. 
These primary concerns against secession are reduced by EU membership or prospective 
membership because as long as the new state remains within the EU or becomes an EU 
member, it will continue to benefit from the EU’s large single market, borderless Schengen 
area, and common currency. These major elements would allow a newly independent state 
to feel minimal negative effects from secession because its market access and opportuni-
ties for its citizens would be essentially unchanged, use of the common currency would 
prevent the need to create a new national currency, and the Schengen area would ensure 
open borders within Europe. Because many of these key benefits are found at the European 
level, retaining EU membership becomes more important than remaining part of the host 
state. The EU’s own institutional structure, under which member state governments are the 
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leading political actor, also makes secession tempting. As a member state in its own right, a 
region which once depended on the host state’s central government to represent its interests 
would be able to hold an equal seat at the table in Brussels. As an independent state, the 
region would have its own seat at the European Council, nominate a commissioner, and 
have a much greater influence across all policy areas than it previously had as part of the host 
state. Integration has also shaped the rhetoric and image of secessionist movements. While 
traditionally separatists are seen as insular and inward-looking, integration has allowed in-
dependence projects to be seen as outward- and forward-looking by searching for oppor-
tunities to play an active role in being part of a larger European family of nations. Pro-EU 
messaging and stances are essentially standard among pro-independence parties and leaders 
with regional national identities (such as Scottish identity) being linked to a European iden-
tity (Muro & Vlaskamp, 2016).
However, like everything European integration touches, there are several layers of 
both political and technical complexity. The benefits of independence for a region outlined 
above are dependent on continued EU membership or quick accession for regions from 
host states that are not EU members. Since the institutions in Brussels have not yet had 
to encounter such a scenario, the question of whether newly independent states would be 
able to keep its EU membership or be able to quickly rejoin is ultimately theoretical until a 
precedent is actually set. Trying to predict the real-world outcome of a region breaking free 
from an EU member state is difficult since the EU treaties do not specify what would occur 
and there has been mixed messaging from EU officials and political leaders on the subject 
(Muro & Vlaskamp, 2016). During the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, the ques-
tion of Scotland’s EU membership was center stage. The pro-independence campaign led 
by then Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond argued that Scotland would be able to retain 
its EU membership while the Better Together campaign in favor of remaining within the 
UK argued that Scotland would lose its membership (Bourne, 2014). These two different 
arguments were grounded in two different theories. The case for continued membership 
was based around the idea of making an amendment to the EU treaties via Article 48 to 
allow continued Scottish membership by common agreement of all existing member states. 
The argument that Scotland would lose membership is based in the belief that because in-
dependence would automatically make the new state a third country, the new state would 
have to re-apply for membership through the often lengthy accession process. 
Both theories are possible, but which scenario would carry out? If voters think that EU 
membership will not be disrupted in any substantial way, independence seems less threaten-
ing. However, if independence means being left outside the EU potentially for years, inde-
pendence will seem riskier. While the European Commission has repeatedly stated that it 
would view any new independent states as third countries needing to re-apply for member-
ship (Bourne, 2014), there are reasons to doubt that this is the approach the Commission and 
the EU member states would in fact take if faced with a newly independent state. If a region 
such as Catalonia or Flanders, both members of the Schengen Area and Eurozone, were to 
lose EU membership overnight due to independence, the EU would face significant disrup-
tions and the risk of economic and political instability would run high. Particularly in the 
case of the Euro, if regions with strong economies were to be kicked out of the Eurozone, 
the economic impact would be felt across the Eurozone and the currency would likely lose 
some of its value. Both the negative economic and geopolitical impacts that the EU would 
face from losing a newly independent region, especially post-Brexit, would likely be damag-
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ing enough for the EU to strongly consider making an exception to allow the new state to 
remain a member. While there is a risk of EU member states dealing with strong secession 
movements domestically vetoing an easy process for new states to hold membership in order 
to disincentivize secessionists in their own countries, the negative costs of expelling the new 
state and potential external pressure from other EU countries may reduce this risk of a veto. 
This is a point that pro-independence forces have argued to voters. The Catalan government 
has highlighted the region’s economic strength as a reason that the EU would want to ensure 
Catalonia’s EU membership. Flemish nationalists have cited the fact that the EU’s capital in 
Brussels would make expelling an independent Flanders from the EU practically unthink-
able. Given that Scotland is no longer in the EU due to Brexit, Scottish independence ac-
tivists argue that Scotland would be welcomed back to Europe and cite access to Scotland’s 
fishing waters as an incentive for the EU to fast-track re-admission. Public comments like 
those from former European Council President Donald Tusk stating that the EU “would 
be enthusiastic” if an independent Scotland reapplied for membership (Tamma, 2020), have 
served to soften concerns about the prospect of rejoining the EU after independence. 
5. Case Review: Scotland
Led by the center-left Scottish National Party (SNP) founded in 1934, the Scot-
tish independence movement has a left-wing, pro-European nationalism at its core (Ce-
rulus, 2014). In 1999, a devolved Scottish assembly and government was established after 
a referendum on Scottish devolution passed in 1997. While for decades the Labour Party 
dominated in Scotland, evidence of a long-standing preference for left leaning policies, the 
SNP and its independence cause began to gain mainstream strength in 2007 after a surge in 
electoral support during Scottish Parliamentary elections. After winning a Scottish parlia-
mentary majority in 2011 by campaigning on the promise to hold an independence refer-
endum, the SNP government in Edinburgh and the UK government in London agreed to a 
legally binding Scottish independence referendum which took place in September of 2014. 
The referendum resulted in Scotland remaining within the UK with 45% of voters backing 
independence and 55% supporting the status quo.
Scotland’s secession movement meets both of the requirements for a strong secession 
movement laid out earlier in this paper: 1) a regional and/or national identity different or 
stronger than the rest of the host state, and 2) a deep, long lasting dissatisfaction with the 
host state. In Scotland, dissatisfaction with the UK stems from a feeling of holding differ-
ent values and a feeling of Scotland’s voice being ignored. Scotland is often referred to 
as “southern Scandinavia,” a reference to its left-wing tendencies and desire to pursue a 
Nordic-style egalitarian society (Curtice, 2020). These core social and political values in 
addition to Scotland’s strong favorability for the EU seemingly run contrary to England, 
which is more center-right politically, Euroskeptic, and favors a smaller welfare state (Muro 
& Vlaskamp, 2016). Not only is the political distinction clear, many in Scotland often feel 
that Scotland’s voice is overpowered by England and is not properly listened to. During the 
2014 referendum campaign and still now, pro-independence campaigners argue that Scot-
land is governed by UK governments it does not vote for, in reference to the fact that it is 
common for the party leading the government in London to not be the party that won in 
Scotland. On specific issues, such as nuclear weapons and EU membership, Scotland’s opin-
ions seem to have made little difference. In Scotland, nuclear weapons are deeply unpopular 
with a sizable majority of Scots in favor of abandoning nuclear weapons altogether (Surva-
tion, 2016). Despite this, the UK’s nuclear weapons which Scotland is so deeply opposed to 
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are stored in Scotland. With Brexit, Scotland voted by over 62% to remain in the EU while 
the UK as a whole voted to leave. After the result, Scottish leaders lobbied hard for both a 
second referendum on the finalized terms of Brexit and for a close relationship to the EU, 
preferably retaining membership of the single market, but their efforts were unsuccessful as 
the conservative-led government in London decided for a hard Brexit. 
During the 2014 referendum, European integration played an important role. The 
question over Scotland’s membership was a major point of contention and uncertainty, 
which has largely been seen to have helped unionists in the campaign. The SNP, however, 
used the EU and European identity to create an open, inclusive, and outward-looking 
public perception of independence, which made independence more acceptable to people. 
Secessionists also used EU membership to minimalize potential negative economic impacts 
and maximize Scotland’s potential to have an influential voice in Europe and on the world 
stage as a whole (Bourne, 2014). While Scottish independence dreams were not achieved 
in 2014, European integration aided secessionists in building a strong movement. As a 
result of Brexit, independence is once again a high priority topic in Scottish politics, with 
polling showing that a second independence referendum would have a realistic chance of 
independence (Curtis, 2020), winning a majority with pro-EU voters with moderate na-
tionalist leanings seemingly more willing to back independence (Muro & Vlaskamp, 2016). 
In the current post-Brexit environment, the SNP has called independence Scotland’s only 
way back into the EU and have pushed hard to equate EU membership with independence 
(Sturgeon, 2021). As a result of integration, Scottish independence is not solely about leav-
ing the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland – it is about joining the larger union of 
European nations, a narrative that will be more attractive to voters than an inward-looking, 
isolationist type of separatism would be.
6. Case Review: Catalonia
After an illegal unilateral independence referendum in 2017, followed by a failed 
unilateral declaration of independence, Catalonia’s secessionist movement quickly gained 
worldwide recongnition. As recounted in Öner (2019), Catalonia’s position within Spain 
has long been a topic on the Catalan political agenda, with most people supporting Catalo-
nia remaining part of Spain with substantial devolved powers (ibid). In 2006, the Spanish and 
Catalan governments agreed to a revised Catalan Statute (Catalonia’s mini regional constitu-
tion) which granted further powers to Catalonia’s devolved government. The expansion of 
devolved powers was popular and mostly satisfied Catalan nationalists with the exception of 
nationalists pushing for fiscal competencies since the 2008 global financial crisis. However, 
the expanded powers were short-lived. In 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court ruled 
several parts of the revised Catalan Statute unconstitutional and reinterpreted other parts in 
ways that favored central institutions in Madrid. The ruling was grounded in Section 2 of 
the Spanish Constitution, which states that “[t]he Constitution is based on the indissoluble 
unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it 
recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of 
which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.” The expanded powers to Catalonia 
were interpreted as a violation of Spanish unity, thus were unconstitutional. The court gave 
similar reasoning in 2017 when it ruled the Catalan independence referendum unconstitu-
tional. The Spanish government in Madrid have also used this logic to deny authorization 
for an agreed, legally binding independence referendum. After the Constitutional Court’s 
2010 ruling, support for independence rose as nationalists who were satisfied with expanded 
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devolution moved to support secession.
Enjoying growing support in Catalonia, the separatist movement is not a fully united 
movement and is mainly led by two political parties, the center-right Together for Catalonia 
(JuntsxCat) and the center-left/left-wing Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC). As Öner 
(2019) explains, the two main factors that drive the movement are: (1) Catalonia’s own 
culture and language differing from that of the rest of Spain, and (2) Catalonia’s economic 
position of being a donor region. Catalan nationalists argue independence is the best way 
to protect and embrace the region’s distinct culture and language, which are not treated 
with the respect it is due by Spanish authorities. Catalonia’s strong economy has led to the 
region contributing more to the Spanish budget than it directly sees in returns through 
public services and investment. Nationalists have used this economic argument to claim that 
an independent Catalonia would be able to invest money previously sent to Madrid into 
Catalan communities. 
Catalan nationalism holds EU membership in high regard and fully supports integra-
tion. This holds firm with Catalonia’s history of being supportive of integration. In 1982, 
Catalonia opened its first representative office in Brussels, four years before Spain became an 
EEC member, and in the 1990s was a vocal advocate of a “Europe of Regions” model for 
the European project and wanted to see more powers granted to the Council of Regions 
(Öner, 2019).
Integration has helped Catalan secessionists avoid being seen as insular and, given that 
continued EU membership is granted, has weakened economic arguments against secession. 
This has allowed independence to become more popular than it likely would be if the EU 
did not exist.
7. Case Review: Flanders
Led by two right-wing political parties, the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) and Flem-
ish Importance (VB), Flemish nationalism has brought the idea of an independent Flanders 
onto the mainstream political stage. Envisioning a gradual defederalization of Belgium re-
sulting in an independent Flemish state, Flemish nationalists believe that the federal Belgian 
state and its extremely fractured political spectrum is ineffective, and that there is no true 
unified Belgian national identity (N-VA, n.d.). Flemish seperatists tend not to hold a strong 
European identity, if any at all, but do support many core elements of European integration 
such as the Euro, single market, and common foreign and defence policy, calling it a “euro-
realist stance” (Cerulus, 2014).
Fueled by holding a different national identity, speaking a different language than 
the other Belgian region (Wallonia), being a donor region, and the belief that the Belgian 
central government is ineffective, the seperatist movement advances its mission by regularly 
pushing for more federal powers to be devolved instead of calling for an independence ref-
erendum. Flanders enjoys a strong economy boosted by foreign investment and hosting the 
headquarters for several EU agencies and institutions. Belgium’s southern region of French-
speaking Wallonia was once an industrial powerhouse, but now has a struggling economy 
with reletively high unemployment rates. As a result, tax revenue generated in Flanders 
is used to supplement the underperformance of Wallonia’s economic output (Drozdiak, 
2016). 
European integration’s establishment of an environment that is peaceful and stable for 
small states has allowed for Flemish independence to become a credible, viable option. EU 
membership is not a main point of discussion in the Flemish independence debate, which is 
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focused almost entirely on domestic issues, but its impacts have allowed for the viability and 
possibility of such a small would-be state to be taken seriously.
8. Case Comparison
The three cases detailed above were selected for both their diversity and their strength 
—the three arguably being the strongest secessionist movements in Europe. The three cases 
mainly differ in how and by whom they are led as well as how they are pursuing indepen-
dence. Scotland’s secessionists are mainly led by a single political party while Catalan and 
Flemish secessionists are led by two political parties. In Scotland and Flanders, secessionists 
are mainly unified politically either on the left or the right, however Catalan nationalists are 
politically divided between the center-right and the center-left/left. In regard to the path 
to independence, both Scotland and Catalonia’s devolved administrations want to hold ref-
erendums. Scotland’s government has ruled out, at least for now, any chance of holding a 
referendum not legally recognized by the UK government, while the Catalan government, 
facing a Spanish government that refuses to grant a recognized referendum, has held a uni-
lateral referendum and has signaled a willingness to do so again if the Spanish government 
continues to stick to its hardline unionist stance. Flanders’ regional government has not 
pushed for a referendum and instead has opted to advocate for a gradual process of transfer-
ring powers to the region with this process eventually resulting in independence once all 
powers have been defederalized. 
Despite these differences, the three secessionist movements are helped by European 
integration in nearly the same ways, primarily by allowing small states to be viable and pros-
perous, and by creating an overarching European identity that allows secessionists to be seen 
as more outward-looking and forward-thinking.
9. Conclusion
Secessionism and European integration, two political projects that seemingly run con-
trary to each other, in practice go together hand-in-hand. Unlike many other issue areas, 
European integration’s effect on secessionist movements is not fully known due in part to a 
lack of substantial academic research into the topic as well as uncertainty over how the EU 
institutions and member states would act in response to a case of secession. However, from 
what can be observed, it appears that while integration has not yet led to any new indepen-
dent states, it has created an environment that has allowed secessionist movements to build 
considerable strength. While only time will reveal whether these secessionist movements 
achieve their goals of creating new states, current observations should send a stark warning 
to capitols across Europe and cause central governments to be observant and responsive to 
potential secessionist movements.
Moving forward, further academic research needs to be conducted to come to a more 
complete understanding of the impacts of integration on separatism. Researchers should 
conduct extensive data collection in the form of on the ground interviews and surveys in 
areas with strong independence movements as well as in regions with small movements still 
relatively on the political fringe. Further research should work to target the influence of 
European integration on views surrounding independence and how important it is to citi-
zens. Through rigorous academic study, a full picture of integration’s impact on secessionist 
movements can be developed. A wave of successful secessionist movements would have the 
potential to drastically reshape Europe; it is therefore imperative that we understand these 
movements better before they become more prevalent. 
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